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THE EFFECT OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS ON THE TECHNOLOGICAL
PERFORMANCE OF COMPANIES IN A HIGH-TECH ENVIRONMENT
  Abstract
A large part of the literature from industrial organisation and management expects that,
compared with unrelated M&As, related M&As show superior economic performance
because of synergetic effects that follow from economies of scale and scope. The current
contribution takes the debate on the effect of different M&As somewhat further by studying
the effect of M&As on the technological performance of companies. In this study the
technological performance of M&As is related to a  high-tech sector, i.e. the computer
industry. The main result of this research is that the so called strategic and organisational fit
between companies involved in M&As seem to play an important role in improving the
technological performance of companies
(mergers, acquisitions, technological performance)1
INTRODUCTION
The central topic of this paper concerns the possible effect that mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) have on the technological performance of companies. This subject of the
technological effect of M&As is clearly related, but not identical, to the more general
question regarding the economic benefits of M&As, for instance in terms of their effect on
the profitability of companies.
In that context a number of influential industrial organisation studies suggest that
companies realize diminishing profitability for an extended period of time after an M&A
because of the cost of integration and poor performance of acquired units (e.g. Caves, 1989;
Cosh, Hughes, Lee and Singh, 1989; Mueller, 1986; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Scherer,
1988). However, some recent contributions, e.g. Odagiri and Hase (1989)  and Scott (1993),
suggest that long-term positive results for M&As are found for diversification through M&As
across related product lines. Largely inspired by Rumelt (1974), the management literature
has moved away from a general evaluation of the economic performance of M&As to an
evaluation of different forms of M&As, such as horizontal, vertical and unrelated M&As
(Hitt et al, 1998; Kusewitt, 1985; Lubatkin, 1987; Montgomery and Wilson, 1986; Singh and
Montgomery, 1987). Although there is still considerable disagreement within the literature, a
substantial part of it expects, primarily on theoretical grounds, that related M&As show
superior performance because of synergetic effects through economies of scale and scope.
In the following we will attempt to take the debate on M&As somewhat further by
studying their effect on the technological performance of companies. As indicated by Link
(1988) little research was done on this particular subject before the late-1980s. In recent years
a small number of contributions to the management literature (Chakrabarti, Hauschildt and2
Sueverkruep, 1994; Gerpott, 1995; Grandstrand, Bohlin, Oskarsson and Sjoberg, 1992 and
Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland and Harrison, 1991) have put this topic on the research agenda.
It is important to note that the technological performance of M&As deals with the long-
term effects of M&As. As mentioned by Chakrabarti, Hauschildt and Sueverkruep (1994),
technology related incentives for M&As affect long-term strategic variables which tend to be
underestimated in much of the current empirical research, that usually focuses on the short-term,
economic effects of M&As. In these long-term effects the expected synergetic characteristics of
M&As can contribute to technological performance through the successful introduction of new
technologies, new products and processes by the combined companies which could eventually
lead to improved profitability of companies. As suggested by a reviewer, there can also be short-
term effects of M&As when the acquiring company intends to only obtain access to R&D and
technological capabilities to simply produce an already existing, combined technological output.
However, when these existing capabilities are used in the further development of new
technological output, these short-term effects are expected to be limited in comparison to the
long-term, synergetic technological effects of M&As. This effect of by merging companies is a
well-known classic issue in the innovation literature  dating back as far as Schumpeter (1942)
where increased size of companies and synergies, through internal growth or by means of M&As,
are positively related to long-term technological performance.
The technological effect of  M&As is also discussed in some previous research on a
related issue, i.e. the motivation for M&As. Frequently mentioned motives are: increased
market share, improved efficiency, expanded R&D efforts, investment adjustment, firm
growth, risk reduction, speedy market entry (Chakrabarti, Hauschildt and Sueverkruep, 1994;
Hitt et al, 1996;  Ikedo and Doi, 1983; Oster, 1994). In older work on M&As from the 1970's,3
increasing R&D activities and improving technological performance seem hardly relevant as
motives for M&As, see de Jong (1976). In Chakrabarti and Burton (1983) technological
motives for M&As appear to be only moderately important across industries. However,
studies by Grandstrand, Bohlin, Oskarsson and Sjoberg (1992), Link (1988) and MacDonald
(1985) do suggest that M&As are an important element in the technology acquisition strategy
of companies, in particular in R&D intensive (high-tech) industries.
We will continue along this line and study the effect of M&As on innovation in a 
high-tech sector, the computer industry. Obviously, M&As are also important in other sectors
but, as  mentioned above, the relation between M&As and technological performance is
probably most evident in high-tech sectors. Furthermore, technological input and output in
high-tech sectors can be measured by standard indicators such as R&D expenditures and
patents, see also the section on the dependent variable for a discussion of the use of patents as
an indicator of technological performance.
In the following we will first outline a general perspective on the effect of M&As on
the technological performance of companies. This general perspective on M&As and the
related set of hypotheses both stress the importance of understanding the conditions under
which M&As might have a positive effect on the technological performance of companies. In
that context we will emphasize the role of strategic and organizational fit in explaining
technological performance differentials. Although both play a substantial role in many
analyses of M&As and economic performance, strategic and organizational fit have received
far less attention in much of the current work on M&As, technological performance and
related issues. After the theoretical background and hypotheses have been explained, our
paper continues with a discussion of our data, the variables and the measures used in this4
study. This is followed by sections in which the actual analysis,  the discussion of the results
and the conclusions from this paper are presented.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
In a number of seminal contributions to the literature, M&As are seen as an important
element in the overall strategy of companies to respond to uncertainty within the economy at
large, uncertainty within particular industries, or uncertainty in the context of repeated
transactions with other companies (Pfeffer, 1972; Sutton, 1980; Williamson, 1996). The
absorption of at least parts of their environment (i.e. other companies) by means of M&As is
one of the alternatives that companies have if they attempt to reduce uncertainty, increase
their control over their environment or reduce their dependency on this environment. (Other
mechanisms that are relevant but which are not discussed or analysed in the context of our
current research are strategic alliances that take the form of a variety of legal and
organizational modes.)  According to Pfeffer (1972) this absorption of other companies by
means of M&As in order to respond to uncertainty can take place through either the
integration of other companies in sector(s) in which a company is already operating, or a
diversification into another sector because the company has become too dependent on its
existing environment. Studying M&As from a more sector-specific perspective, Link (1988)
and MacDonald (1985) arrive at somewhat similar conclusions as M&As are seen as a
mechanism to increase control over the environment of companies in quickly changing, R&D
intensive, industries.
However, increasing control over the current or the new environment of companies
cannot be taken as a goal in itself. The search for new, rewarding opportunities has to be part5
of this process of absorption of a company’s environment. As a consequence, in order for a
company to be successful, the objective of increasing control and integration by means of
M&As, ultimately, has to lead to improved performance. In the context of companies
operating in a high-tech, R&D intensive environment, improved performance implies that
integration by means of M&As has to support the continuous search for new technological
capabilities. We expect that, if M&As are successful, they enable companies to further
develop new skills and improve their exploratory learning (Dodgson, 1993) so as to  increase
the technological performance of companies.
In other words, M&As for the benefit of the combination as such seem hardly
instrumental for companies that intend to increase control over their environment, improve
their technological skills and raise their technological performance. Recent contributions by
Baysinger and Hoskisson (1989), Hitt et al (1991), Hitt et al (1996) and Markides (1992)
indicate that diversification and increases in the diversified scope of companies as such can
result in decreasing R&D inputs and decreasing technological outputs. Following some
suggestions in the literature (Datta, 1991; Hitt et al, 1998; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986) we
propose that in order to be successful not only in establishing M&As, either in the current
environment or in a new environment, but also to generate the expected results, M&As are
contingent upon both a !strategic fit  and an !organisational fit’ that enable M&A partners to
collaborate in future activities. This implies that in order to achieve synergetic effects through
M&As, the strategic fit through market, product and technological complementarities or
relatedness of companies has to be supplemented by an organisational fit in which the
organisational structure of the merging companies appears to match. Effective control over6
parts of the environment by means of M&As which also leads to improved performance is
expected to be dependent on this strategic and organisational correspondence of the
companies involved.
In the following we will discuss crucial elements of the strategic and organizational fit
necessary to improve the technological performance of companies in a high-tech
environment, separately. We reconstructed these elements of the strategic and organizational
fit from the literature where these issues are analyzed in the broader context of the general
performance of M&As (e.g. Datta, 1991). These conditions for the success of synergetic
M&As are analyzed in terms of strategic fit related to the degree of the existing product-
market relatedness of M&As, the technological correspondence of M&As and their
organizational fit. These different elements of the fit between companies cover the current
markets of companies, their present and future-oriented technological activities and the
similarity in their organizational structure.
Strategic fit: related and unrelated M&As
In the literature one finds several categorisations of M&As in terms of their !relatedness 
which usually can be traced back to the original classification scheme of the US Federal
Trade Commission  (Montgomery and Wilson, 1986). Horizontal M&As involve companies
that are closely related as to the products or services they to produce, i.e. both companies
operate in the same product-market. Vertical M&As involve companies that had a potential or
existing buyer-seller relationship prior to the M&A. Conglomerate or unrelated M&As
involve essentially companies that are unrelated in terms of the product-markets in which
they are operating and of which the M&As are part of a widely diversifying strategy.
A substantial part of the literature seems to suggest that in general conglomerate7
M&As are less successful than horizontally and vertically-related M&As (for instance, Datta,
1991; Kusewitt, 1985; Oster, 1994;  Porter, 1987; Singh and Montgomery, 1987). As shown
by Datta(1991) there are also studies that find little or no evidence of such a relationship. On
theoretical grounds, however, the idea that a strategic fit of companies, in terms of a
relatedness of the  product-markets in which companies are operating, remains appealing.
Obviously, related M&As can be expected to profit from economies of scale and scope that
should generate more synergetic benefits than in the case of unrelated M&As of companies
that have no other relationship to each other than becoming part of one overarching system of
corporate control.
As our study focuses not on the economic performance of M&As in general but on the
specific issue of technological performance, the relationship between the degree of
relatedness of M&As and performance might be of a slightly different nature. In the case of
horizontal M&As, we can expect that joint or complementary innovation programs of the
combined companies will generate new products and new technologies in which both scale
and scope effects seem to be beneficial to the technological performance of the merged
companies. For vertical M&As, cost reduction by means of integrating upstream or
downstream !partners  can be expected to generate economic results that can be reinvested in
innovative programs. The integration of sophisticated suppliers or users can also help to
identify both market needs and introduce new production technologies that contribute to the
technological performance of companies.  For unrelated M&As these effects of scope and
scale economies are in general more difficult to materialise and the literature suggests that
these M&As are mainly intended to achieve financial synergies. This leads us to expect that
related M&As, of both a horizontal or a vertical nature, and conglomerate M&As affect8
technological performance differently. (However, as suggested by one reviewer, it has to be
stressed that synergistic results of M&As, on which we focus in this paper, are still dependent
on positive financial economies in order to achieve the necessary interrelationships. In other
words, without short-term economic results for M&As, long-term results in technological
performance may never materialize.)
Under these conditions, the above suggests the following hypothesis:
H. 1 Related M&As lead to higher technological performance of companies than unrelated
M&As.
Strategic fit: technological relatedness of companies involved in M&As
So far most of the debate on the strategic fit of companies involved in M&As seems to focus
on the industry-aspect of the relatedness of companies in terms of their product-markets. As
our research deals with the technological performance of M&As, it seems appropriate to also
consider the issue of technological relatedness of companies that enter into M&As.
Technological relatedness of companies, then, refers to the degree to which companies are
active in particular fields of technology development that they share with (potential) partners
in M&As. These fields of technology have to be understood in terms of the activities of
companies related to relatively broad categories of technological disciplines and engineering
capabilities, such as electronics, electrical engineering, chemistry, bio-engineering and their
sub-categories, that coincide with fields of technology as for instance identified by patent-
classes. As with the line of reasoning for product-markets, we can expect that M&As of
companies from similar, horizontally related, fields of technology and also technologically,
vertically related, M&As will outperform technologically unrelated M&As. Also here,
synergies in scale and scope are the main reasons for expecting these different outcomes.9
Compared to technologically unrelated M&As, the synergies and combined technological
activities of related M&As are expected to enable companies to shorten the innovation lead-
time, share technological expertise and to engage in larger, combined projects than would be
possible within the once separated companies.
Somewhat surprisingly, the literature on the strategic fit of companies involved in
M&As seems relatively silent on this particular topic. Jemison and Sitkin (1986) appear to
only hint at the relevance of this aspect of strategic fit. Gerpott (1995) discusses technological
fit in the context of the successful integration of different R&D activities after an acquisition
has taken place. Assuming that the successful integration of different R&D activities leads to
improved technological performance, Gerpott s (1995) empirical findings suggest that the
higher the degree of technology relatedness of companies involved in an M&A, the more
successful the M&A will be. According to this line of thought for understanding the
importance of technological relatedness of M&As, following a similar logic as with product-
market relatedness, we suggest that:
H. 2 Technologically related M&As will lead to higher technological performance of
companies than technologically unrelated M&As.
Strategic fit: research intensity of companies involved in M&As
The technological aspect of the strategic fit of M&As, discussed in the previous section,
covers the !breadth  of the potential sharing of  technological capabilities of companies across
fields of technology. As far as the !depth  of technological relatedness, i.e. the similarity in
actual research effort and research input, is concerned, the question remains whether R&D
intensive companies look for M&A partners that have a similar or higher level of research
activity. Also, the question comes to mind whether companies with low levels of R&D might10
use M&As to acquire companies with higher levels of R&D, either in an attempt to improve
their research capabilities within their existing fields of activity or in an attempt to diversify
into more research-intensive industries.
Early research by Chakrabarti and Burton (1983) suggests that companies in mature
industries with low R&D intensity appear to form M&As with companies in R&D-intensive
industries in order to diversify into high-tech areas. However, MacDonald (1985) found no
evidence of such dissimilarity. His research mainly indicates that R&D intensive firms aim at
M&As with companies from other R&D intensive sectors, that are similar in their R&D
orientation in order to reach synergies in future R&D. Hall (1990) also mentions the
importance of synergistic motives for explaining M&As in R&D intensive industries. She
suggests that R&D intensive companies form M&As with other R&D intensive firms,
whether they are from similar or from different industries.
The above suggests that it is important to consider the effect of the R&D intensity of
M&A partners on their combined technological output. Then, if one controls for the research
intensity of the sectors in which M&As take place, we can expect that M&As with companies
that have an R&D intensity above their sector average tend to lead to higher technological
output. A major motive for  M&As with above average R&D intensive companies is that
these companies can be expected to have certain research capabilities and relevant skills that
are future-oriented. This is probably important in a variety of industries but in particular in a
high-tech environment where R&D capabilities are crucial for the further growth and
development of companies (Freeman and Soete, 1997; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). In
other words, the ‘depth’ of this technological relatedness is found in the actual above-average
effort of M&A partners to create new knowledge through R&D that is expected to gradually11
improve their technological performance. Contrary to this,  M&As with companies with an
R&D intensity below their sector average will lead to lower technological performance of the
combined companies. As the combined R&D activity of these merged companies decreases,
we can expect that a gradual erosion of the technological capabilities of these companies
which will be translated into a decreasing technological performance. Hence:
H. 3 The R&D intensity of partner-companies in M&As affects the technological
performance of the combined company: combinations with companies of an above
sector-average R&D intensity improve the post-M&A technological performance of
companies, whereas combinations with companies of a below sector-average R&D
intensity decrease the post-M&A technological performance.
Organisational fit: company size and M&As
Although the concept of organisational fit between companies involved in M&As covers a
large number of aspects related to administrative routines and company-specific
characteristics  (Datta, 1991; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986), similarities or differences in size of
companies do, in our opinion, to a large extent catch many aspects of organisational fit. Size
of companies also relates to differences in organizational forms such as multi-divisional
company structures and single-divisional companies that characterize differences between
small and large companies (Chandler, 1990). As a !proxy  for organisational fit we can
understand size of companies to express !certain ways of doing business . In other words,
large companies have generally developed a completely different way of organising
themselves, for instance along divisional structures and other formal organisational routines,
that is quite different from small and medium sized companies where informal structures are
still most common. This not only applies to differences in general, but in particular to the12
different roles that large and small companies play with regard to technological development
(Dosi, 1988; Freeman and Soete, 1997). This implies that M&As between companies of
different sizes have organisational consequences, in terms of the actual organisational fit of
companies, that can affect the technological output after the M&A has taken place. There is
some evidence that the organisational differences between large and some small companies in
the actual management of the innovation process are diminishing (Haggblom, Calantone and
Di Benedetto, 1995) but we expect that by and large these differences still exist. In particular,
we can expect different procedures for R&D allocation and differences in strategic
technology decision making. 
The empirical research seems to support this understanding of the differences in
organisational fit between large and small firms. Chakrabarti, Hauschildt and Sueverkruep
(1994) found that combinations of large and small companies are confronted with
organizational problems affecting technical success after the M&A took place. Similarly,
Gerpott (1995) established that the size ratio of acquiring and acquired company affects the
degree to which R&D functions are successfully integrated after an M&A. Smaller ratio s
(indicating a merger of companies that are close to being equals in size) are found to be
related to more successful integration, whereas large size-differentials within the M&A
generate major difficulties with integrating the R&D activities of M&A partners.
What this part of the empirical literature suggests is that the lack of organizational fit
between companies of different size-classes has some serious consequences for the
integration of the innovative activities of different M&A partners. This seems to contradict a
large part of the literature (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994; Jemison
and Sitkin, 1986) that suggests that the disparity between sizes of merging companies might13
be relatively easy to deal with in case of the integration of manufacturing, marketing and
sales. However, in the complex world of non-routinized and specialized R&D associated with
specific technological capabilities, organizational integration aimed at technological
performance might be more complex and more difficult to achieve than improved
performance related to largely standard activities such as manufacturing and sales (Nelson
and Winter, 1982). This implies that, if companies are too far apart in terms of their size and
related aspects of their organisational structure, the realisation of improved technological 
performance after the M&A might not be as simple as assumed on the basis of simple
arithmetic. In other words, adding up the research and other technological activities of 
smaller partners to those of a large company, assuming that the integration process will take
place rather smoothly, underestimates the organisational intricacies of such an M&A between
unequal partners. Hence:
H. 4 There is a positive relationship between the degree of similarity in terms of the size of




The level of analysis in this study refers to the companies that are engaged in M&As and not
the individual M&As as such. The main reason for this approach is that  technological
performance is generally measured at the level of the company and not at the level of an
individual M&A. In particular for a small acquisition the effect on the technological
performance of each individual !transaction  is difficult to trace, whereas the combined effect
of a number of acquisitions of a company is detectable. Also, the registration of technological14
performance, e.g. through patents, usually takes place at the level of the company at large and
not at the level of an acquired or merged unit.
As mentioned above, some previous research reveals that M&As are expected to
affect technological performance of companies, in particular in R&D intensive industries. We
chose companies in the international computer sector as the primary group for the analysis
because of its high-tech character (OECD, 1997) and the uncertainty that characterises
technological and economic development in this industry. In this study the computer or data
processing industry is defined by companies that produce mainframes and other computers,
peripherals, CAD/CAM/CAE equipment, data communications equipment and other data
processing products. The uncertainty surrounding the computer industry is well-documented
in a large number of  popular publications and in the academic literature, see e.g. Duysters
(1996); Harper (1996); Korzeniowski (1988); Malerba et al (1991); Mansell (1993) and
Raphael (1989). These uncertain conditions are caused by endogenous technological change
within the industry itself, the dependence on technological developments in the supplying
micro-electronics and other components industries and the convergence of computer and
telecom technologies which has led to lateral entry in both industries (Duysters and
Hagedoorn, 1998). The above implies that we analyse the effect of M&As on the
technological performance of these computer companies whereas the M&As in which these
companies are involved might of course be related to a variety of manufacturing industries.
We excluded service related M&As from the analysis, including software related M&As, as
these service activities are known to generate little or no technical innovations measured by
means of patents.
The above implies that, as in so many other somewhat comparable studies,  we use a15
single-industry design, albeit with a choice for a large and international sector with a
substantial number of M&As, to control for potential industry effects. We study the effect of
a total number of  201 M&As, made during the period 1986-1992, in a sample of 35
companies. Thirty of these companies have their headquarters in the USA, three companies
are from Asian countries and two companies are European. These 35 companies ( see
Appendix I) with  M&As, are taken from a total of 100 companies that account for more than
90% of the international computer market (Gartner, 1994). In terms of market share the 35
M&A-active companies in our sample represent  nearly 70% of the international computer
market. The other 65 companies, all relatively small firms, did not have any M&A during the
period under investigation. Given the major differences between these sub-populations, in
terms of the size of companies and their relevance to the computer industry, it is impossible
to use the other sub-population as a control group.
Variables
We took the patent intensity growth of US patents of the companies in the sample from 1989
to 1994 as an indicator of the dependent variable technological performance. We took the
number of patents that firms applied for in all IPC classes to measure their technological
performance. As with so many other indicators, this patent indicator is subject to a debate
regarding its bias and shortcomings (Archibugi, 1992; Cohen and Levin, 1989; Griliches,
1990). However, despite some shortcomings it is generally accepted as the most appropriate
indicator that enables us to compare the technological performance of companies  in terms of
new technologies, new processes and new products (Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Aspden, 1983;
Bresman, Birkenshaw and Nobel, 1999; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Cantwell and
Hodson, 1991; Devinney, 1993; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Griliches, 1990; Napolitano and16
Sirilli, 1990; Patel and Pavitt, 1995; Pavitt, 1988). Even authors that are somewhat critical of
the overall use of patents as an indicator of technological performance or innovation, such as
Arundel and Kabla (1998) and  Mansfield (1986), admit that they are more than appropriate
in the context of the current, high-tech sector. Also, the less patents are used for cross-
sectional analysis that ignores inter-sectoral differences in the propensity to patent, the better
this indicator reflects the technological performance of companies in one sector.
Some recent research comparing patents with other indicators of new product and process
development ( Devinney, 1993; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999)  has established that there is
“… a systematic relationship between a firm’s innovation output (i.e. sales of innovative
products) and its actual patenting behaviour …” in particular in high-tech industries such as
the computer industry (Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999, p. 622).
Although, the literature already indicates that patents can be an appropriate indicator
of technological performance and new product and process development, we also considered
new product and process announcements as such. We looked at new product announcements,
for instance through Dialog’s NPA/Plus, as an alternative indicator of technological
performance of companies. After consulting a small sample we decided not to use this as an
alternative measure. These new product announcements are based on marketing press releases
and little or no screening appears to be undertaken by the databank operator. Patents, on the
other hand, in particular those registered in an advanced economy such as the USA, are
screened for their original contribution during the pre-application period and during the actual
application period by company-engineers, patent lawyers and patent office officials and as
such this indicator appears less biased than new product announcements from the marketing
departments of companies.17
The screening of new product and new process announcements through technical
‘mapping’ and ‘technometrics’ with technical benchmarks based on inter-subjective
engineering and technical input could provide some additional insight that might be useful for
very detailed studies on the measurement of technical performance of individual products
(Grupp, 1994). However, given the objectives of this study and the usefulness of patents as a
general indicator of technological performance we prefer to follow the ‘mainstream’ of
innovation studies and apply patents as our main indicator.
As the size of companies will have its effect on the technological performance of
companies, as suggested by many innovation studies, we will take the growth in !patent
intensity  (the ratio of the number of patents and total revenues) as the actual dependent
variable.
The time-lag between M&As and the change in technological performance covers an
average period of six years (from the mean of the years for the independent variables, 1989,
to the final year for which the changes in technological performance is measured, 1994).
According to Singh (1971) and Buono and Bowditch (1989) it takes  on average nearly five
years before organizations are assimilated and gains of the M&A are materialized. According
to Scherer  (1984b) and Pakes and Griliches (1984) it takes  on average about one year before
inventions through R&D lead to patent applications. Taken together these two periods add up
to an average time-lag of about six years. Given the degree of variance found for both the
period of organizational assimilation and the effective innovation time-span, as reported in
previous research, we experimented with several alternative analyses. We used shorter
intervals as well as different time-lags, without compromising the size of the sample. The
outcomes of these alternative analyses were similar to the results presented in this paper.18
In the statistical analysis presented below we will apply the following independent
variables:
Related and unrelated (conglomerate) M&As are measured in terms of the
(dis)similarity of the SIC code of the industries of M&A partners at the three digit level
(Kusewitt, 1985). For related M&As in the computer industry we constructed a list of related
SICs (see Appendix II) based on studies of the computer industry (Duysters, 1996, Harper,
1996, Malerba et al, 1991, Mansell, 1993). This list of related SICs was presented to a small
group of senior specialists from the computer industry who all confirmed that these industries
are generally accepted as related industries. For each M&A the SIC code of the target
company was obtained through  Securities Data’s data base on M&As (see section on Data
sources). The actual measure being used for each computer company in the sample is the
share of its related M&As as a percentage of all its M&As.
Technologically related and technologically unrelated M&As are measured in terms of
the (dis)similarity of the patent classification (IPC) code of the patents owned by the M&A
partners at the three digit level. These patent classes represent the generally accepted
perception of fields of technology by scientists and engineers (Griliches, 1990) to a similar
degree as for instance industrial classes represent generally accepted classifications of
industries by economists. For technologically related M&As we constructed a list of related
IPCs (see Appendix III). The same group of specialists from the computer industry, that we
consulted on the industry relatedness, confirmed that the patent classes taken to measure
technological relatedness could be used to indicate the technological relatedness of M&As. If
the majority of the M&A target’s patents falls in related IPC classes, then the target company
is considered to be technologically related. The actual measure for each company is the share19
of technologically related M&As as a percentage of all its M&As.
R&D intensity of M&A partners is measured as the ratio of the R&D intensity of the
M&A partners, based on their average R&D expenditures of the two years before the M&A,
controlling for the average sector R&D intensity. We assessed the R&D intensity of each
single firm against its industry average. If e.g. a target company has a 1.5 higher R&D
intensity than the industry average, the value of the ratio would be 1.5. In order to arrive at
one overall ratio for the combined set of M&As we added up the ratios and divided this
number by the number of M&As. This number is divided by the ratio of the acquirer to end
up with the value of the variable. If the acquirer has a ratio of 0.5 (half the intensity of the
industry average) and the combined set of targets have a ratio of 1.5 then the value of this
variable is 3. The ratio of the acquired firm is 3 times higher than that of the acquiring firm.
That means that the ratio is 3 (1.5 divided by 0.5). Thus, the higher the value of this measure,
the higher the R&D intensity of the target(s) in comparison to the R&D intensity of the
acquirer.
Similarity of size of M&A partners refers to the ratio of the size of both companies
involved in the M&A. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total revenues in the year
before the M&A. Logarithms are taken to correct for a small number of very large companies.
We divided the size of the acquiring firm by the size of the target firm. Because in all the
cases the acquiring firm was the larger of the two, a lower ratio implies more similarity
among the firms. The ratio’s of size for companies with a number of M&As are also added up
and divided by the number of their M&As.
Control variables
The R&D intensity of the companies in the sample (1986-1992), i.e. R&D expenditures as a20
share of total revenues, is taken as a control variable because we expect a direct effect of
R&D on patent activity as research efforts will (at least partly) be transformed into patents. In
the literature the relation between R&D and patents has been studied extensively. Kamien and
Schwartz's (1982) have established that, on average, there is a direct relation between
innovative effort or input and technological output. However, it is added that other factors can
influence the transformation and the relation may not be linear. In studies by Bound,
Cummins, Griliches, Hall and Jaffe (1984), Scherer (1984a) and Hausman, Hall and Griliches
(1984) it is mentioned that patenting output decreases gradually with an increase of R&D
expenditures.
Research on the effect of the internationalization of innovative activities through
international M&As suggests both positive and negative effects of this international
diversification on technological performance, but the positive effects seem to be dominant
(Freeman and Hagedoorn, 1995; Hitt et al, 1997 and Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994). These
positive effects are largely due to different local advantages generated by international R&D
sourcing through acquired companies. Therefore, we will control for the international and
domestic character of the M&As of the companies in the sample. The international and
domestic character of the M&As of a company is determined by the share of international
M&As in the total number of its M&As as registered according to the home-country of the
headquarters of companies during the period 1986-1992.
A third control variable that we introduce relates to the possible effect of experience
with establishing of M&As on the performance of M&As. It is well-known that one of the
main problems for companies active in the field of M&As is the difficult task of acquiring
adequate information on target firms. It is obvious that, depending on the situation, target21
companies might have an incentive to somewhat misrepresent their innovative potential by
overstating or understating their technological capabilities and the value of their research
programs. This !inspection problem  with M&As or the problem of the possible lack of
adequate information can be solved partially by experience as companies establish some
routines and learning capabilities regarding the valuation of other companies. As suggested by
 Hitt et al (1998) and Oster (1994) companies that have built up some experience in M&As
might find it easier to assess the value of target firms. Experience with the actual
incorporation of the innovation programs of other companies in the overall innovation
strategy will also help to improve the post-M&A performance. This suggests that experienced
M&A active firms have higher post-merger technological performance than inexperienced
companies. Experience with M&As is measured by taking the natural logarithm of the
number of M&As made during the seven years period from 1986 to 1992.
Data sources
Data on M&As for the period 1986-1992 is derived from a data bank owned by Securities
Data which we used via on-line access. This data bank contains information on world-wide
M&As and its relational form facilitates the linking of data files to each other and also to
other data banks. Within the M&As data base there is information on the year the M&A was
established and company information on the acquirer, the target, the parent acquirer and the
parent target firm. The industry information is provided in SIC codes of the acquiree and
acquirer.
Data for the size of companies and their R&D expenditures is taken from several
issues of Gartner Group s annual Yardstick top 100 world-wide covering a period from the
early eighties to the early nineties. The Yardstick top 100 world-wide is an authoritative22
statistical review of the international computer industry comprising the top 100 computer
companies. Data in the Yardstick was updated annually through surveys and research by
Gartner Group consultants and industry analysts. When data was missing, estimates were
taken from industry analyst input and from other available industry sources. The Yardstick
contains calendar year information, not information based upon fiscal years, which allows us
to make better comparisons between companies. Also, the Gartner data is adjusted for the
effect of currency exchange rates.
We obtained additional data on R&D expenditures, size and revenues of companies
involved in M&As through well-known data bases such as Compustat, Disclosure and
Worldscope.
The data on patents for the dependent variable (technological performance) is taken
from the US Patent and Trademark Office database (US Department of Commerce). Although
this US data could imply a bias in favour of US companies and against non-US firms, the
group of non-US companies in this sample represents a group of innovative and rather large
firms that are known to patent world-wide. Furthermore, the innovation literature suggests
several other reasons to take US patents as an indicator. Frequently mentioned are the
importance of the US market, the !real  patent protection offered by US authorities, the level
of technological sophistication of the US market which makes it almost compulsory for non-
US companies to file patents in the USA. See  Patel and Pavitt (1991) for a discussion on the
use of US patent data.
ANALYSIS
In order to test the hypotheses we applied a lagged ordinary least square regression model (see23
table 2). The correlations in table 1 do not suggest multicollinearity  and there is also no
indication of autocorrelation (see the Durbin-Watson statistic in table 2). However, given the
relatively high R
2 of  the model we undertook some additional tests  to detect possible
multicollinearity. First, we regressed each independent variable on all the other independent
variables, see Appendix IV. This is described as the most preferred method of assessing
multicollinearity in Lewis-Beck (1993). The advantage of this method over the frequent
practice of examining bivariate correlations among the independent variables is that this
method takes into account the relationship between an independent variable and all other
variables. This test in Appendix IV did not detect multicollinearity either as adjusted R
2
below 0.6 are seen as more than acceptable (Lewis-Beck, 1993). In addition, we performed a
number of other multicollinearity diagnostics, taking a closer look at VIF and Tolerance
values (see table 2). Again, there were no signs of multicollinearity. Finally, we evaluated the
condition indexes and examined the variance proportions of the coefficients (see Appendix
V) without finding any indication of multicollinearity.
----------------- insert table 1 about here --------------
----------------- insert table 2 about here -------------
Table 2 demonstrates that, as expected in hypothesis 1,  our analysis generates a
significant, positive relationship between the degree to which companies use related M&As
and their technological performance. For hypothesis 2, which concerns the aspect of
technological relatedness, we found a positive but statistically insignificant effect of these
technologically related M&As on the technological performance of companies.
Our results do, however, show that the acquisition and merging of companies with
above average R&D intensity significantly improve the technological performance of the24
acquiring firm (hypothesis 3). Also, the expected relationship between the degree of similarity
in terms of the size of companies involved in M&As and the technological performance of
the acquiring firms (hypothesis 4) was indeed established in our analysis (lower scores are
associated with greater similarity).
The control variable for the R&D intensity of companies seems to have a significant,
albeit negative, impact on the improved technological performance of companies. This
indicates that, as already found in other contributions discussed in the above, patenting output
decreases with an increase of R&D expenditures. In other words, an increase in  R&D
intensity of companies does not imply a growth in technological performance. Our findings
for the second control variable suggest that, as found in some previous research, international
M&As improve the technological performance of companies. However, experience of
companies with M&As does not seem to have a significant, positive influence on their
technological performance.
DISCUSSION
Our analysis demonstrates that major aspects of the strategic and organizational fit of
companies engaged in M&As seem important for generating improved technological
performance in a high-tech environment. Our findings suggest that the strategic fit between
companies in related product-markets increases the innovative potential of M&As. This
finding adds additional support  to much of the empirical evidence of previous research on
the economic performance of M&As that indicates that related diversification through M&As
is more beneficial to companies than unrelated diversification (Oster, 1994;  Porter, 1987;
Singh and Montgomery, 1987). The role of this particular aspect of the strategic fit of
companies in explaining performance improvement  supports much of the conventional25
wisdom from  e.g. economics regarding the economies of scale and scope that companies can
achieve when they expand into related activities. The strategic fit of M&As in terms of broad
product-market categories seems to generate a base-line for joint activities that secures the
overall relevance of these M&As to the improved performance of the combined companies.
However, it is important to note that this aspect of the strategic fit is still largely related to the
existing activities of companies, whereas the technological capabilities of merging companies
are expected to be also dependent on future-oriented technological aspects of their strategic
fit.
Things seem to become somewhat more complicated  when we look at this
technological aspect of the fit of M&As. We found somewhat mixed evidence regarding the
impact of the technological fit of merging companies on their technological performance. It
appears that linking up to above-average R&D intensive companies generates better results
than merging with companies that have a similar profile in terms of their technological track
record. We recall that some of the older literatures (Link, 1988; MacDonald, 1985) already
indicated that M&As with  R&D intensive firms would enable acquiring companies to
increase control over high-tech environments that are relevant to them. When companies
establish M&As with companies with an above-average R&D intensity, this implies that they
are integrating partners that are more likely to be engaged in new activities and as such this
adds to the formation of new capabilities and learning skills within the new entity. In other
words, these R&D intensive M&As are instrumental to the more general process of
exploratory learning (Dodgson, 1993) and they play an important role in the improvement of
technological competences that are crucial for companies to remain competitive in a high-
tech environment (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Hitt et al, 1998).26
It is obvious that the !depth  of the technological relatedness of M&As, i.e. the
similarity in levels of R&D effort, affects the increased R&D potential of the combined
companies. When companies engage in M&As with companies with higher R&D inputs,
these M&As are expected to be future-oriented as the increased R&D intensity of these
companies focuses on the search for new technologies, products and processes. As such these
R&D increasing M&As have a long term, strategic effect that we found to lead to improved
technological performance of the combined companies.
However, there is considerable chance of duplication of existing technological
capabilities, with a similar ‘breadth’ of technological relatedness of companies, when they
only share broad patenting profiles based on previous technological achievements. In that
case, there are fewer learning opportunities and companies are expected to have more
difficulty engaging in new activities and developing new technological capabilities that will
lead to improved technological performance.  In other words, unlike the ‘depth’ of
technological relatedness, the ‘breadth’ of technological relatedness of M&As only reflects
the status quo of the technological capabilities of companies and, as such, expansion through
technologically similar M&As cannot be expected to lead to improved technological
performance. Combining companies with similar technological capabilities and a somewhat
similar technological track-record merely duplicates existing capabilities which have little
effect on the future technological performance of the combined companies.
The organizational fit of companies, their similarity of size, which we found to be
important to explain improved technological performance, seems to benefit the actual
integration process of merging companies. Previous research (Chakrabarti et al, 1994;
Gerpott, 1995) already mentioned that large differences in size of companies indicates27
dissimilarities in the organisational setting of partners, which might frustrate the actual post-
merger integration process. From the perspective of the technological performance of M&As,
our research shows that a large difference in size of companies, indicating a poor
organisational fit, generates weaker performance than in the case of greater organisational
similarity of partners. The popular business literature provides many examples from high-tech
industries (in particular biotechnology, software, microelectronics and computers) where
large companies have great difficulty in integrating small companies with a different ‘culture’
while keeping key-employees from these acquisitions ‘on board’.
Although not directly related to the effect of strategic and organizational fit on the
technological performance of companies, our research suggests some interesting results for
international M&As and the effect of experience with M&As on technological performance.
It appears that companies that have a preference for international M&As, that benefit from
several international R&D sources and from different regionally concentrated technological
competencies, improve their technological performance.  As discussed in the above this
highlights the importance of international learning through M&As as being very important for
companies in a high-tech environment that has also become highly internationalised (see also
Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998).
Somewhat surprisingly, we found no clear evidence of the positive effect of the
experience of companies through a larger number of M&As. Increasing the number of M&As
does not seem to necessarily improve the performance of companies in a linear way.
However, most companies in this sample have some experience with M&As as they made
more than one M&A in a few years. What this finding does indicate is that, if there is an
experience effect regarding M&As at all, the effect of increased experience would most28
probably wear off beyond a rather low threshold. Also, as suggested by Hitt et al (1998), for
companies to learn from their M&As, the sheer number of M&As as such could be less
decisive than their effective learning capability with regard to M&As and other external
sources of innovation.
CONCLUSIONS
Our study focuses on a single, high-tech industry, albeit a large one and with an international
population consisting of a variety of companies, that are studied for a period of nearly a
decade. As our results might reflect some industry and period-specific factors, elaboration of
the study in different settings could generate useful additional insights. With this caveat in
mind, we can draw the following conclusions.
Our research demonstrates that M&As can contribute to improving the technological
performance of companies in a high-tech environment. However, it has to be stressed that
both the organisational and the strategic fit of the companies involved in these M&As are
crucial for the technological success of M&As. These critical factors were already discussed
in some earlier contributions that concentrated mainly on the general effect of M&As on
economic performance and profitability. Not only does our current research establish the
important role that organisational and strategic fit seem to also have for the technological
performance of M&A-active companies, it in particular emphasises the importance of
linking-up to other research-intensive companies. This suggests that the acquisition of these
companies, through which the acquiring company can improve its technological skills and
expected learning capabilities, has a positive effect on the technological performance of
acquiring companies after M&As have taken place.
The current contribution does not investigate the short-term economic benefits of29
M&As but it concentrates on the technological performance of companies that might have
long-term strategic consequences, eventually leading to increased economic performance. In
that context these M&As can be interpreted as an attempt of companies to increase both
control over their environment in order to respond to uncertainty and to improve their
performance. The successful integration of other companies in a familiar environment and the
search for new opportunities through M&As are both mentioned in that context as major
mechanisms in a two-fold strategy to improve technological performance. The relevance of
market relatedness of M&As stresses the importance of uncertainty reduction by means of
integration of companies that are active in similar sectors and that have some similarity in
terms of product-markets. The integration of R&D intensive companies, however, creates the
necessary new skills and capabilities that enable the company to learn about new perspectives
that can decrease its dependency on its existing environment and improve its performance.
Therefore, the external acquisition of technological capabilities by means of M&As can, if
proper attention is paid to the strategic and organizational fit of companies,  prove to be an
important strategic advantage for companies in high-tech sectors.30
Table 1 Univariate statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients, n=35
Mean Standard
Deviation




2.Related M&As 0.9630 0.0972 0.591** 1.000
3.Technologically
related M&As 0.9289 0.2394 -0.247 -0.111 1.000
4.R&D intensity
of M&A partners








0.7417 0.3825 -0.076 -0.165 -0.114 -0.052 0.348 1.000
7.Experience with
M&As
1.1036 0.9376 0.341* 0.258 -0.237 0.037 -0.522* -0.313 1.000
8.R&D intensity
of companies
0.0925 0.0387 0.523* 0.100 -0.430* 0.550* -0.022 0.019 0.123 1.000
*    Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)31
Table 2 Regression estimates of the influence of M&As (1986-1992) on the
technological performance of companies (growth of patent intensity, 1989-
1994) in the international computer industry, n=35
Variables Beta          T Collinearity statistics
Tolerance VIF
Constant   -1.15
Related M&As  0.607    4.88***  0.904  1.106
Technologically related
M&As
 0.293    1.80  0.529  1.892
R&D intensity of M&A
partners
 1.056    5.68***  0.405  2.468
Similarity of size of
M&A partners
-0.362   -2.16* 0.499  2.004
International character
of M&As
  0.306     2.17*   0.704 1.420
Experience with M&As  0.186    1.26  0.638 1.567
R&D intensity of
companies
 -0.522    -3.53***  0.640  1.562
*     p < 0.10
**   p < 0.05
*** p < 0.01
R
2 = 0.888 Adj R
2 = 0.790 Std Er = 0.00537
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APPENDIX II RELATED AND UNRELATED M&As ACCORDING TO SIC
CODES OF PARTNERS
Related M&As are between companies that are both found in the following SIC classes:
357.  Computer and office equipment
366. Communications  equipment
367.  Electronic components and accessories
369. Misc. electrical machinery, equipment and supplies (Batteries, Disk, Tape)
382.  Measuring and controlling devices
All other cases refer to unrelated M&As.
APPENDIX III TECHNOLOGICALLY RELATED AND UNRELATED M&As
ACCORDING TO PATENT CLASSIFICATION OF PATENTS
OF PARTNERS
Technologically related M&As are between companies of which the patents correspond with
the following IPC classes:
Seq. nr. (IPC code) Description
27 Office computing and accounting machines
40 Misc. electrical machinery, equipment and supplies
43 Electronic components and accessories and communications equipment
55 Professional and scientific instruments
All other cases refer to technologically unrelated M&As39
APPENDIX IV  MULTICOLLINEARITY TEST (REGRESSION ESTIMATES
OF  EACH INDEPENDENT VARIABLE ON ALL OTHER
VARIABLES)
Variables R
2       Adj. R
2  
Related M&As  0.481        0.135
Technologically related
M&As
 0.528        0.213
R&D intensity of M&A
partners
 0.704        0.506
Similarity of size of
M&A partners
0.633        0.388
International character
of M&As
  0.673        0.455
Experience with M&As  0.705        0.509
R&D intensity of
companies
        0.497        0.16540





Constant A B C D E F G
1 7.093 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
2 .441 4.010 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .07 .46 .00
3 .215 5.741 .00 .09 .00 .16 .00 .13 .06 .00
4 .133 7.313 .00 .04 .06 .01 .01 .49 .16 .00
5 .071 10.021 .00 .78 .01 .38 .00 .01 .03 .00
6 .043 12.815 .00 .02 .88 .01 .02 .06 .03 .00
7 .003 48.855 .05 .00 .04 .44 .84 .23 .01 .46
1
8 .002 63.920 .94 .07 .01 .01 .13 .00 .26 .54
* Dependent variable: Technological performance
A = R&D intensity of companies
B = Related M&As
C = R&D intensity of M&A partners
D = Technologically related M&As
E =  International characters of M&As
F =  Experience with M&As
G =  Similarity of size of M&A partners